

## Message Text

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ACTION EUR-12

INFO OCT-01 IO-10 ISO-00 EURE-00 SSO-00 NSCE-00 INRE-00

USIE-00 CIAE-00 PM-03 INR-05 L-02 ACDA-05 NSAE-00

PA-01 RSC-01 PRS-01 SP-02 TRSE-00 SAJ-01 SS-15 NSC-05

DODE-00 STR-01 CIEP-01 COME-00 AEC-05 AECE-00 CU-02

OMB-01 SAM-01 /075 W

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O R 251820Z NOV 74

FM USMISSION NATO

TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 8978

INFO ALL NATO CAPITALS 4736

AMEMBASSY MOSCOW

USMISSION GENEVA

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 1 OF 2 USNATO 6557

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: PFOR, NATO

SUBJECT: REVISION OF SPC CHAIRMAN'S DETENTE REPORT

GENEVA FOR USDEL CSCE

REF: A) STATE 258740; B) USNATO 6511; C) USNATO 6419

D) STATE 249735

1. TRANSMITTED BELOW, PER REF B, IS LATEST VERSION OF SPC  
CHAIRMAN'S REPORT ON DETENTE REVISED AS REQUESTED BY PERMREPS  
AT NOV. 20 NAC.

2. ALTHOUGH REVISED PAPER SHARES AND PERHAPS EVEN STRENGTHENS  
SOMEWHAT THE NEGATIVE CAST OF PREVIOUS VERSION (REF C), IT  
DOES LIST RELEVANT DETENTE CONSIDERATIONS AS IDENTIFIED IN  
QUESTIONS ANNEXED TO EARLIER TEXT. AS SUCH, PAPER SEEMS TO MEET  
LIMITED OBJECTIVE SET FOR IT BY DEPARTMENT IN REF D. IF DEPARTMENT  
CONCURS, MISSION PROPOSES TO APPROVE PAPER AT NOV. 25 NAC  
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WHILE NOTING IN GENERAL WAY THAT IT SEEMS TO PLACE UNDUE  
STRESS ON THE NEGATIVE ASPECTS OF THE DETENTE PROCESS AND,  
THEREFORE, MAY NOT PROVIDE A SUFFICIENTLY BALANCED APPRAISAL.  
IF NEED ARISES, WE WILL ALSO REPEAT PROCEDURAL SUGGESTIONS IN  
PARA 2, REF D.

BEGIN TEXT

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH                      DOCUMENT  
22ND NOVEMBER, 1974                  C-M(74)81(REVISED)

OBJECTIVES OF, OBSTACLES TO AND PROSPECTS FOR DETENTE

REPORT BY THE CHAIRMAN OF THE POLITICAL COMMITTEE  
AT SENIOR LEVEL

AS INSTRUCTED BY THE COUNCIL ON 2ND OCTOBER, MEMBERS  
OF THE SENIOR POLITICAL COMMITTEE ON 19TH SEPTEMBER  
ON US/SOVIET RELATIONS, AND THE REPORT OF THE ATLANTIC POLICY  
ADVISORY GROUP DATED 19TH JULY ON "FUTURE TRENDS IN EAST/WEST  
RELATIONS" (C-M(74)47).

2. AT THE SUGGESTION OF MEMBERS OF THE SENIOR POLITICAL  
COMMITTEE, THE EXPERT WORKING GROUP ON "TRENDS IN THE SOVIET  
UNION AND EASTERN EUROPE" ADDRESSED SOME ASPECTS OF DETENTE AS  
SEEN FROM THE SOVIET AND EASTERN EUROPEAN SIDE. THE SENIOR  
POLITICAL COMMITTEE TOOK INTO CONSIDERATION THE OUTCOME OF THE  
EXPERT WORKING GROUP'S DISCUSSION (ANNEX TO THE EXPERT WORKING  
GROUP'S REPORT C-M(74)73). A JOINT MEETING OF THE SENIOR  
POLITICAL COMMITTEE AND THE ECONOMIC COMMITTEE WAS ALSO HELD  
ON THE IMPLICATIONS FOR THE ALLIANCE OF RECENT ECONOMIC  
DEVELOPMENTS AT WHICH A SUGGESTED OUTLINE PREPARED BY THE  
ECONOMIC COMMITTEE WAS CONSIDERED (AC/119-A(74)119/  
AC/127-A/449 AND ANNEX).

3. THE ATTACHED REVISED PAPER IS NOW SUBMITTED IN  
ACCORDANCE WITH THE INSTRUCTIONS OF THE COUNCIL OF  
20TH NOVEMBER. AS PROPOSED BY THE COUNCIL, THE ISSUES RAISED  
IN THE COURSE OF THE SPC DISCUSSION HAVE BEEN GROUPED IN THE  
ATTACHED ANNEX UNDER TOPIC HEADINGS. SINCE THE QUESTIONS  
INTRODUCED IN THE DEBATE IN THE COMMITTEE TENDED TO REFLECT  
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THE PARTICULAR PRECUPATIONS OF INDIVIDUAL DELEGATIONS, NO  
QUESTIONS HAVE BEEN DELETED FROM THE LIST, BUT IT IS HOPED THAT  
THE GROUPING MAY HELP TO IDENTIFY PARTICULAR ISSUES.

I. THE ROLE IN DETENTE OF US/SOVIET BILATERAL RELATIONS, AND  
THE STRATEGIC BALANCE

1. THE EXTENT TO WHICH SOVIET POLICIES OF DETENTE ARE  
CENTRED ON BILATERAL SOVIET/US RELATIONS, AND IN PARTICULAR ON  
THE STRATEGIC BALANCE, AND THE EXTENT TO WHICH THEY INVOLVE  
ASPECTS OF SOVIET RELATIONS WITH OTHER MEMBERS OF THE ALLIANCE  
WHICH COULD BE EXPLOITED. CAN "GLOBAL" DETENTE CONFLICT WITH  
THE INDIVIDUAL INTERESTS OF ALLIED GOVERNMENTS IN THE FIELD  
OF EAST/WEST RELATIONS?

2. THE ATTITUDE OF THE SOVIET UNION, IN THE LONG RUN  
TO A BALANCED MILITARY SITUATION AND ITS READINESS TO RENOUNCE  
A ONE-SIDED MILITARY SUPERIORITY. THE POSSIBILITIES OF CHANGE  
IN SOME ELEMENTS OF THE PRESENT SOVIET DOCTRINE ACCORDING TO  
WHICH:

- " SOVIET ARMAMENTS ONLY SERVE PEACE AND DETENTE AND  
THREFORE THREATEN NO ONE";

- MILITARY POWER IS EQUAL TO POLITICAL INFLUENCE, AND  
POLITICAL PRESSURE CAN BE EXERCISED ON THE BASIS OF  
MILITARY SUPERIORITY.

## II. THE WIDER ASPECTS OF DETENTE

3. THE WEST'S ATTITUDE TO THE SOVIET DISTINCTION  
BETWEEN "EXTERNAL" DETENTE WHERE THE SOVIET UNION HAS SHOWN  
WILLINGNESS TO MAKE CONCESSIONS IN ORDER TO PROMOTE REDUCTION  
OF TENSION ON AN INTER-STATE LEVEL, AND "INTERNAL" DETENTE  
INVOLVING INTERNAL LIBERALIZATION. ASSUMING THE PROMOTION OF  
FREER MOVEMENT OF PEOPLE AND FREER FLOW OF INFORMATION BETWEEN  
EAST AND WEST TO BE AN INDISPENSABLE ELEMENT OF DETENTE POLICY  
FOR THE WEST, BECAUSE ONLY IN THIS WAY CAN REAL CONFIDENCE  
GROW, THE POSSIBILITIES OF MAKING FURTHER PROGRESS IN THIS  
AREA IN THE CSCE AND SUBSEQUENTLY. THE NATURE OF THE FOLLOW-  
UP TO THE CSCE WHICH WOULD BEST CONTRIBUTE TO PROGRESS  
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TOWARDS DETENTE.

4. THE SOVIET UNION REJECTS THE SPREADING OF WESTERN  
IDEAS WITHIN ITS SPHERE OF INFLUENCE AS "ANTI-SOVIET" AND  
"INCOMPATIBLE WITH DETENTE", BUT EMPHASIZES AT THE SAME TIME  
THAT IT IS ENTITLED TO LAUNCH IDEOLOGICAL OFFENSIVES IN THE  
WEST AS PART OF "PEACEFUL COEXISTENCE". ASSUMING THE SOVIET  
UNION MAINTAINS ITS CONCEPT, THE DEGREE TO WHICH THE WEST SHOULD  
INVERSELY INSIST ON COMPETITION OF IDEAS IN THE COMMUNIST WORLD.

5. THE DEGREE OF READINESS OF THE SOVIET UNION TO ACCEPT  
THE UNIFICATION OF EUROPE INCLUDING ALL ITS POLITICAL, ECONOMIC  
AND MILITARY ASPECTS, AND NOT TO ATTACK IT AS BEING "CONTRARY  
TO DETENTE".

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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 2 OF 2 USNATO 6557

6. AFTER THE END OF CSCE, WILL THE SOVIET UNION INSIST ON  
BRANDING AS "REVANCHIST" AND "ANTI-DETENTE" ANY POLICY AIMED AT  
THE EVENTUAL EXERCISE OF THE RIGHT OF SELF-DETERMINATION BY THE  
GERMAN PEOPLE AND-ON THIS BASIS-AT REUNIFICATION? THE BEST  
MEANS OF DEALING WITH THIS.

7. THE DEGREE OF READINESS OF THE SOVIETS TO CONCEDE THE  
STRICT OBSERVANCE AND FULL APPLICATION OF THE QUADRIPARTITE  
AGREEMENT ON BERLIN AND TO ALLOW BERLIN TO BE TAKEN AS A  
YARDSTICK FOR THEIR RESOLUTION TO PURSUE DETENTE.

8. THE POSSIBILITY OF THE SOVIET UNION RENOUNCING OR  
MODIFYING IN THE COURSE OF DETENTE, ITS LATENT HEGEMONIAL  
ASPIRATIONS CONCERNING WESTERN EUROPE.

9. THE SOVIET UNION PROPOSES A EUROPEAN COLLECTIVE  
SECURITY SYSTEM. HOW SHOULD THE WEST DEAL WITH THIS CONCEPT?  
FROM A POLITICAL POINT OF VIEW, IS THE ALLIANCE APPROACH OF A  
REDUCTION OF MILITARY CONFRONTATION, ESPECIALLY BY MBFR, AN  
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ADEQUATE RESPONSE?

10. THE RISK IN CURRENT EAST/WEST NEGOTIATIONS, E.G. ON  
CBMS AND IN THE MBFR OF CREATING A SPECIAL AREA OR AREAS IN  
EUROPE SUBJECT TO SPECIAL REGIMES, AND THE DANGERS INHERENT  
IN THIS.

11. THE MORE NUMEROUS THE CONTACTS BETWEEN EAST AND WEST  
BECOME, THE MORE STRONGLY SOVIET CONTROL OVER EASTERN EUROPE  
SEEMS TO BE DEVELOPING IN ORDER TO SCREEN THEIR OWN PUBLIC AND  
THAT OF THEIR ALLIES FROM WESTERN INFLUENCES. THE WEIGHT TO BE  
GIVEN TO THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE SOVIET UNION AND THE  
OTHER COUNTRIES OF THE WARSAW PACT IN ASSESSING THE PROSPECTS  
FOR AND DEGREE OF SUCCESS OF DETENTE POLICIES. THE  
POSSIBILITIES FOR A CHANGE IN THE PRESENT FROM OF SOVIET  
HEGEMONY OVER EASTERN EUROPE. THE PROSPECTS FOR A MODIFICATION

OF THE BREZHNEV DOCTRINE UNDER THE INFLUENCE OF DETENTE POLICIES.

12. THE ASSESSMENT OF THE IMPLICATIONS FOR THE DETENTE PROCESS OF SOVIET EFFORTS TO GAIN INFLUENCE IN EUROPEAN COUNTRIES OUTSIDE THE ALLIANCES (FINLAND, YUGOSLAVIA, AUSTRIA).

ECONOMIC CONSIDERATIONS AND DETENTE(1)

13. THE WESTERN ATTITUDE TOWARDS THE SOVIET ARGUMENT THAT ECONOMIC-TECHNOLOGICAL CO-OPERATION SHOULD BE INDEPENDENT OF POLITICAL CONDITIONS.

14. IN VIEW OF THE ASSUMED LONG-TERM OBJECTIVES OF THE SOVIET UNION, PARTICULARLY HAVING REGARD TO ITS ARMAMENT POLICY, IS IT IN WESTERN INTEREST TO GRANT CREDITS AT REDUCED INTEREST RATES IN ADDITION TO THE TRANSFER OF TECHNOLOGICAL KNOW-HOW FROM WEST TO EAST? OR SHOULD ECONOMIC EXCHANGES TAKE PLACE ON A PURELY COMMERCIAL BASIS?

15. THE EXTENT TO WHICH THE ECONOMIC BALANCE HAS SHIFTED IN FAVOUR OF THE EAST IN VIEW OF ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENTS IN THE WEST OWING TO ENERGY, RAW MATERIAL, FINANCIAL AND EMPLOYMENT PROBLEMS, AND THE EXTENT TO WHICH THIS REDUCES THE POSSIBLE LEVER EFFECT OF ECONOMIC CO-OPERATION FOR POLITICAL IMPROVEMENTS. CONFIDENTIAL

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THE EXTENT OF THE CONTINUING IMPORTANCE TO THE SOVIET UNION OF DETENTE AND, FOLLOWING FROM THIS, THE MARGIN WITHIN WHICH THERE IS ROOM TO EXERCISE PRESSURE ON THE SOVIET UNION. WHAT PRESSURES ARE POSSIBLE AND REALISTIC?

16. TO WHAT EXTENT MIGHT THE SOVIET UNION BE TEMPTED TO PROFIT FROM WESTERN ECONOMIC, FINANCIAL AND MONETARY DIFFICULTIES AND THEIR POSSIBLE SOCIAL CONSEQUENCES? MIGHT THE SOVIET UNION, IN THIS CONTEXT, BE LED TO ACT IN A MANNER SUCH AS COULD WEAKEN OR MODIFY THE POLITICAL AND SOCIAL SYSTEMS OF THE WESTERN COUNTRIES?

III. IMPLICATIONS OF THE SOVIET APPROACH TO DETENTE

17. THE EXTENT OF MAJOR DIFFERENCES OF OBJECTIVES BETWEEN EAST AND WEST IN PURSUIT OF DETENTE. WHAT ADVANTAGES CAN THE WEST GAIN? WHAT PRICE WILL THE WEST BE WILLING TO PAY? HOW BEST CAN WE ENSURE THAT THE BALANCE OF CONCESSIONS WILL BE IN FAVOUR OF THE WEST?

18. THE CONSEQUENCES IF SOVIET INTEREST IN DETENTE IS ESSENTIALLY TACTICAL. CAN A POLICY OF BUILDING UP A NETWORK OF MUTUAL INTERESTS IN DETENTE BETWEEN EAST AND WEST STILL SERVE TO CONSOLIDATE DETENTE IF THE SOVIET APPROACH IS TACTICAL? THE IMPORTANCE OF THE PRESENT SOVIET LEADERSHIP AS A FACTOR DETERMINING SOVIET DETENTE POLICIES. POSSIBLE ALTERNATIVE

POLICIES FOR THE SOVIET LEADERSHIP.

IV. PROBLEMS OF PUBLIC PRESENTATION OF DETENTE

19. THE SOVIET UNION IS TRYING TO PLACE PUBLIC OPINION BEFORE AN OVER-SIMPLIFIED ALTERNATIVE: "DETENTE OF COLD WAR". POSSIBLE STEPS BY THE WEST TO MAKE THE PUBLIC AWARE OF ITS MORE DIFFERENTIATED DETENTE CONCEPT, WHICH CONSISTS OF A BROAD SCALE OF ACTIONS, STARTING WITH A BUSINESS-LIKE RELATIONSHIP THAT COULD DEVELOP INTO CLOSE CO-OPERATION IN ALL FIELDS.

20. THE PUBLIC PRESENTATION PROBLEMS THE ALLIANCE IS LIKELY TO FACE IN THE FUTURE IF THE PRESENT PROCESS OF DETENTE CONTINUES. THE PROSPECTS FOR MAINTAINING THE NECESSARY PUBLIC SUPPORT FOR AN ADEQUATE LEVEL OF DEFENCE SPENDING. THE POLITICAL CONFIDENTIAL

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POSSIBILITY OF INSISTING ON PRESENT WESTERN REQUIREMENTS IN, FOR EXAMPLE, CSCE, IF SUCH INSISTANCE APPEARS TO BE THREATENING DETENTE. THE POSSIBLE NEED FOR ACTION TO PREPARE PUBLIC OPINION AGAINST THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH A SITUATION ARISING.

FOOTNOTE:

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(1) SEE ALSO ANNEX TO AC/119-A(74)119)  
AC/127-A/449  
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## Message Attributes

**Automatic Decaptioning:** X  
**Capture Date:** 11 JUN 1999  
**Channel Indicators:** n/a  
**Current Classification:** UNCLASSIFIED  
**Concepts:** n/a  
**Control Number:** n/a  
**Copy:** SINGLE  
**Draft Date:** 25 NOV 1974  
**Decaption Date:** 01 JAN 1960  
**Decaption Note:**  
**Disposition Action:** RELEASED  
**Disposition Approved on Date:**  
**Disposition Authority:** garlanwa  
**Disposition Case Number:** n/a  
**Disposition Comment:** 25 YEAR REVIEW  
**Disposition Date:** 28 MAY 2004  
**Disposition Event:**  
**Disposition History:** n/a  
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**Enclosure:** n/a  
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**Film Number:** n/a  
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**Handling Restrictions:** n/a  
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**Legacy Key:** link1974/newtext/t19741185/abbryym.tel  
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**Locator:** TEXT ON-LINE  
**Office:** n/a  
**Original Classification:** CONFIDENTIAL  
**Original Handling Restrictions:** n/a  
**Original Previous Classification:** n/a  
**Original Previous Handling Restrictions:** n/a  
**Page Count:** 6  
**Previous Channel Indicators:**  
**Previous Classification:** CONFIDENTIAL  
**Previous Handling Restrictions:** n/a  
**Reference:** A) STATE 258740; B) USNATO 6511; C) USNATO 6419 D) STATE 249735  
**Review Action:** RELEASED, APPROVED  
**Review Authority:** garlanwa  
**Review Comment:** n/a  
**Review Content Flags:**  
**Review Date:** 10 APR 2002  
**Review Event:**  
**Review Exemptions:** n/a  
**Review History:** RELEASED <10 APR 2002 by martinml>; APPROVED <29-Oct-2002 by garlanwa>  
**Review Markings:**

Declassified/Released  
US Department of State  
EO Systematic Review  
30 JUN 2005

**Review Media Identifier:**  
**Review Referrals:** n/a  
**Review Release Date:** n/a  
**Review Release Event:** n/a  
**Review Transfer Date:**  
**Review Withdrawn Fields:** n/a  
**Secure:** OPEN  
**Status:** NATIVE  
**Subject:** REVISION OF SPC CHAIRMAN'S DETENTE REPORT  
**TAGS:** PFOR, NATO  
**To:** STATE INFO ALL NATO CAPITALS  
MOSCOW  
GENEVA  
**Type:** TE  
**Markings:** Declassified/Released US Department of State EO Systematic Review 30 JUN 2005